Week 1

two thought experiments

Jackson, "Epiphenomenal qualia" & "What Mary didn't Know"

Sacks, "Stereo Sue" [Sakai]

Mary in the Black-and-White Room

Week 2

ability hypothesis

Lewis, "What experience teaches"

Pettit, "Motion blindness and the knowledge argument," Introduction and §1 (through p. 118)

Tye, "Knowing what it's like: the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument"

Week 3

acquaintance hypothesis

Bigelow and Pargetter, "Acquaintance with qualia"

Conee, "Phenomenal knowledge"

Week 4

old fact

Nida-Rümelin, "What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States"

» background on philosophy of language

Loar, "Phenomenal states (Revised Version)"

Week 5

Loar, continued

» more background on philosophy of language

property dualism argument

White, "The property dualism argument " [Sakai]

Week 6

Block, "Max Black's objection to mind-brain identity" [Sakai]

White, "A posteriori identities and the requirements of rationality" [Sakai]

did she know everything physical?

Horgan, "Jackson on physical information and qualia"

Week 7

Stoljar, "Two conceptions of the physical"

Van Gulick, "So many ways of saying no to Mary"

Week 8

Jackson redux

Jackson, Postscripts

Spring Break

Chinese Room

Week 9

Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs" [Sakai]

Preston, "Introduction"

Week 10

Block, "Searle's arguments against cognitive science"

Rey, "Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AI"

Week 11

Searle, "Twenty-one years in the Chinese room"

Winograd, "Understanding, orientations, and objectivity"

Week 12

Haugeland, "Syntax, semantics, physics"

Josh Lewis (PO '06), "Defending computationalism" [Sakai]

Week 13

Week 14

student presentations

Week 15