

**Who Gets Designated a Terrorist?****Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?**Colin J. Beck and Emily Miner, *Pomona College*

This study examines formal terrorism designations by governments through the lens of organization studies research on categorization processes. It is argued that designations hinge on markers from the organizational profile of a militant group. Using cross-sectional data on militant organizations and designations by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union, multivariate analyses find that listed organizations do not merely have a track record of violence against a government's citizens, but also tend to target aviation and have an Islamic ideological basis. Mixed support for geopolitical factors is found, but imageries of hegemonic interest are not confirmed. Secondary analyses suggest that newer images of terrorism may replace older ones in classification schemes but further research is needed to know whether this is because of policy adaptation or the effect of spectacular events like September 11<sup>th</sup>.

**Introduction**

It is no secret that what exactly constitutes terrorism is ambiguous and constantly debated. Academic strategies of defining the concept of terrorism have ranged from mapping consensus among researchers (e.g., Schmid 2004; Schmid and Jongman 1984; Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler 2010), identifying commonalities in targets or actions of those employing violence (e.g., Bergesen 2007; Goodwin 2006; Tilly 2004), and considering who the terrorist actor is (e.g. Gibbs 1989; Lizardo 2008). The dissensus, however, is not just academic; policy makers and governments face much the same issue, even though legal and academic definitions serve different purposes. For example, the American Government alone employs at least 22 different legal definitions of terrorism (Perry 2004). This potential ambiguity is quite astounding if we consider the

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legal and political ramifications an official designation of terrorism carries. Placement of a group on the United States Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organizations list, for instance, is considered one of the most important counterterrorism policy tools available (Cronin 2003).

Further, the popularity of such terrorism lists is growing (de Jonge Oudraat and Marret 2010), even though cumbersome procedures, ambiguous legal definitions and political considerations make them unwieldy (Pillar 2003). This begs the question: how are government determinations of what constitutes terrorism made? More specifically, what types of organizations are placed on official lists of terrorists? Drawing on insights from neoinstitutional organization studies, we argue that militant groups are more likely to be listed when they conform to an audience's expectation of what terrorism is.

While systematic research on the designation of terrorist organizations is distinctly limited, previous work on counterterrorism tends to emphasize two different approaches. First, much research focuses on policies and the conditions that make them effective (e.g. Epifanio 2011; Enders and Sandler 1993; Heymann 2001; Pape and Feldman 2010; Pillar 2003). Here, counterterrorism, and the designation of terrorist groups, is what governments claim it to be—a method for responding to organizations that target citizens and threaten national security (see European Union 2001, United Kingdom 2000, United States Department of State 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). From this perspective, the actions and victims of a terrorist organization are the most salient criteria.

The second approach highlights geopolitical concerns and strategic interests. Prior research has emphasized the importance of environments in which terrorism occurs (Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman 2006), and a large point of recent debate has been whether or not democracies are more susceptible to terrorism (e.g., Pape 2003, 2005; Savun and Phillips 2009) or less (e.g. Choi 2010; Findley and Young 2011; Li 2005). A government's relations with a militant organization's home country could thus influence designation. For instance, the American War on Terror has been charged to be a cover for naked global strategic interests, such as an attempt to preserve and extend U.S. hegemony, serve capitalist economic interests and maintain control of crucial resources (e.g., Chomsky 2002; Johnson 2007; Wallerstein 2004). Designation of terrorism is thus argued to be subject to manipulations of language and symbols by the powerful (e.g., Guild 2008; Jackson 2005; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005; Oliverio 1998; Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005; Pokalova 2010). Yet geopolitics need not be only Machiavellian; interests could also include contributing to the security of allies, encouraging democracy and protecting democratic nations and ending intractable internal conflicts (see Pillar 2003; Mendelsohn 2009). There could also be a more complex interplay with international law and norms, and thus the connection between a country and the international community may influence the designation of terrorism (Murphy 2003).

In short, designations of terrorism are a complex matter with much potential ambiguity. We therefore emphasize a third perspective. Neoinstitutional organizations research has stressed that the social construction of identities,

reputations and practices has numerous effects on organizational performance and forms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan, Polos and Carroll 2007; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rao 1994; Zuckerman 1999). Terrorism is also socially constructed, and perceptions of terrorist threat can be based off of more than just assessments of actual risk (Ben-Yehuda 2005; Black 2004, Deflem 2004; Oliverio 1998; Turk 2004). Classifications of terrorism may thus derive from shorthand cognitive frames and schemas for assessing an organization. Specifically, we argue that the organizational profile of a militant group, including its strategies and ideological basis, will affect the likelihood of designation net of all other factors.

To substantiate this argument, the analytical key is not just to examine the groups that appear on government terrorism lists, but also to compare them to unlisted organizations that are also active. We therefore identify militant groups from the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010) that have been active between 1994 and 2008, which covers the time period in which formal government designations of terrorism have been made. We then match our data to terrorist lists from three different governments who are the primary designators of terrorist organizations: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Using multivariate logistic regressions of the activities and characteristics of militant groups and their home countries, we explore in a comparative fashion the factors that influence the formal designation of terrorism. Our results confirm a role for the use of categorical schemas in terrorism designations and suggest broader implications for research on terrorism and organizations. In the next section, we detail our theoretical expectations.

## The Categorization of Terrorism

While international terrorism has been a consistent feature of the post-World War II system, legal designation of foreign terrorists through formalized lists is a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning in 1997 with the United States' Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. Since then, government designations of terrorism have grown in popularity across the world. Formal terrorist lists display quite a bit of similarity in their definitions and practices (Cronin 2003; de Jonge Oudraat and Marret 2010), but, as we shall show, have notable variation in what groups they do designate.

### *Legal Mechanisms of Designation*

The American Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list evolved from a congressionally mandated annual report *Patterns of Global Terrorism* begun in 1985. Originally, the report served the purpose of providing information on acts of terrorism against American citizens. In 1997, a formalized list of terrorist organizations with accompanying legal sanctions was introduced. For listing purposes, the American Government primarily defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets


by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (United States Department of State 2010a). Groups designated as terrorists on the FTO list must be foreign, engage in terrorist activity and threaten the security of the United States, including attacks against American citizens (United States Department of State 2010b). The list is updated every 2 years with additions and removals of groups who no longer meet these criteria. In addition, the U.S. Government also maintains lists of terrorist organizations under Executive Order 13224 issued in September 2001 and the Terrorist Exclusion List (part of the 2001 Patriot Act) for financial sanction and immigration control respectively.

The United Kingdom and the European Union structure their designations in a similar fashion. The United Kingdom’s primary instrument, the Terrorism Act 2000, defines terrorist groups as “any association or combination of persons” which “commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism” (United Kingdom 2000:Sections 121 and 3(5)). Listing and delisting occur more frequently than in the United States, with review every 6 months, and allow for an appeal process. Similarly, the European Union also reviews its designations every 6 months, but does not allow appeals. The European Union designates terrorist groups under two separate lists: (1. people and organizations specifically involved with Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban (currently Regulation 881 of 2002) and (2. those involved in any terrorism in general (EU Common Position 2001/931). Terrorism is defined as “intentional acts” that intimidate a population or destabilize a country’s fundamental structures (European Union 2001).

Overall, there has been increasing standardization and convergence in the mechanisms of designation of terrorism. All of the lists have similar purposes, similar definitions of terrorism and similar sanctions that come from being designated. Even with isomorphic policies, however, governments construct notably different lists. The United States has designated 91 terrorist organizations at some point, the European Union 62 and the United Kingdom 60. Of the 126 different groups that have been listed, only 24 percent are designated by all three governments, 22 percent are designated by two governments and 55 percent by one government only (see Figure 1). The groups designated by all three governments include many of the most well-known threats, such as Al-Qaeda and the Basque separatist group ETA. Individual government designations reflect more various concerns: the United Kingdom sanctions militants in Northern Ireland at higher rates as well as South Asian groups; the United States displays more globally spread designations including Latin American groups like the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda; and the European Union engages in more “domestic” designation of a variety of European anarchist and leftist militant groups.

Notably, the listings by the three governments are not significantly statistically correlated, even though there may be cross-national influence. Thus, similar counterterrorism policies and procedures do not result in similar terrorist designations. This suggests that there is more at play than responses to an organization’s actions, as each government’s policies state.

**Figure 1. Percent of Overlap between Three Governments' Terrorist Designations with Exemplar Organizations, 1997-2008 (N = 127)**



### ***Theorizing Classification***

The sociological perspective on terrorism tends to emphasize that it is a social construction of deviance and threat (Oliverio 1998; Turk 2004) that governments employ for social control (Black 2004; Deflem 2004; Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). For instance, in earlier decades, state sponsors of terrorism were designated as a tool in the fight against communism (Turk 2004). Legal classifications of terrorism may thus derive from symbols of threat as much as actual assessments of danger. Our theory is simple—the designation of terrorists is affected by markers from an organization's profile, where certain types of groups are more likely to be seen as terrorist than others, even when controlling for their activities and measurable geostrategic concerns. Below we highlight how neoinstitutional approaches to the study of organizations can shed light on this process through understanding the development of markers that signal membership in ambiguous categories.

The effect of categorical schemas is a common theme in neoinstitutional research on organizations. Scholars have long argued that practices and forms are not driven just by instrumental concerns, but have a strong element of social constructionism, often with a goal of increasing organizational legitimacy (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). More recent work has

emphasized the role of audiences in constructing schemas of categorization to which organizations must conform or risk the loss of legitimacy, reputation and efficacy (Rao 1994; Zuckerman 1999).

Thus, organizational identities can be based more on audience classification than what the organization actually does or how it self-identifies (Hsu and Hannan 2005). For political violence, this line of thought suggests the importance of the audience's judgments in determining not only which actions are terrorist but which actors. Terrorism is theater (Jurgensmeyer 2000), and groups claim attacks to disseminate their message, garner support and affect an audience (Beck 2008; Bergesen 2007; Ben-Yehuda 2005; Hoffman 2006; Schmid and Jongman 1984). But organizations research suggests that such claims will not be highly effective in determining an audience's reaction (Hsu 2006; Zuckerman et al., 2003).

Further, audience images of terrorism are heavily mediated, primarily by the media and governments (Oliverio 1998). Just as curators decide on genres of art (DiMaggio 1987), we might say that governments curate the categories of militancy and political violence. Thus, to understand the designation of terrorism, it is imperative to consider what markers are used to classify groups.

There can be much flexibility in determining which features mark membership in a particular category. In particular, when organizational types and rules for categorization are not yet well established, audiences may tend to rely on comparisons between cases in an ad hoc fashion (Hannan, Polos and Carroll 2007). Given that the designation of terrorism is ambiguous, contested and relatively new (Perry 2004; Pillar 2003), the rules for typifying political violence are likely still emergent. Thus, the expert categorizers (in this case, the government) could have a large degree of leeway in their decision-making.

As formal designations of terrorism are only 15 years old, the current markers for terrorism categorization could come from the "new wave" of international terrorism, which is primarily religious in nature (Jurgensmeyer 2000; Rapaport 2004; Robison, Crenshaw and Jenkins 2006). We thus argue, first and foremost, that ideology is a primary marker of similarity. Specifically, recent counterterrorism efforts focus on the threat of further action by radical Islamists, particularly with continued military interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia. For example, in 2008 the United States named the Islamic separatist Rajah Sulaimain Movement in the Philippines a specially designated global terrorist group, even though it is quite small and has engaged in a limited number of attacks. In contrast, the larger and more active nationalist-separatist Balochistan Liberation Army in Pakistan remains undesignated, even though the country is at least as geostrategically important to U.S. interests as the Philippines. Therefore:

*Hypothesis 1:* Islamic organizations are more likely than other groups to be designated as terrorists, *ceteris paribus*.

Second, targets are also salient markers of terrorism (Bergesen 2007; Brandt and Sandler 2010; Schmid and Jongman 1984). In an earlier era, skyjackings seemed to define international terrorism, and even though the prevalence of this

target has declined (Enders and Sandler 1993), threats to aviation may still loom large as signifiers of global terrorism. For instance, the International Sikh Youth Federation is a designated terrorist organization according to the American and British Governments, even though it has carried out only a few attacks. Crucially, however, one of these included the bombing of an airplane. Compare this to its undesigned country-mate, the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which has carried out at least 180 attacks since 2004, all of them on the ground. Accounting for aviation targets also allows us to consider the effect of inertia in classification. Hence:

*Hypothesis 2:* Organizations that attack aviation targets are more likely to be listed than other organizations, *ceteris paribus*.

Finally, suicide attacks have emerged as an important contemporary strategy of militant groups and represent an innovation in terrorist campaigns (Pape 2003, 2005). Suicide attacks may also carry a particular moral affront that makes them more likely to signify terrorism to an audience (Bloom 2005). Illustratively, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (DHKP/C) in Turkey uses suicide attacks and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, even as the similarly active National Liberation Front of Corsica avoids suicide attacks and remains undesigned though it targets a European state. Thus:

*Hypothesis 3:* The more an organization employs suicide attacks, the more likely it is to be designated as terrorist, *ceteris paribus*.

The origins, or in organization studies parlance, “seeds,” of these categorical markers is an important issue. There are a number of features that can create the seeds for organizational types. Organizational ecologists, for instance, suggest that categories are most likely to emerge when organizational density and contrast from existing types are high (Hannan, Polos and Carroll 2007; Ruef 2000). For terrorism forms, there are limits to this approach: terrorism is relatively low in density when compared with all other contentious movements, and while the contrast is high when compared with peaceable movements, among adopters of militant tactics there is a large degree of ambiguity as to what constitutes terrorism, or war or rebellion.

Another explanation from recent research is that forms can emerge when atypical organizations are successful and receive outside attention (Jonsson, Greve and Fujiwara-Greve 2009; Smith 2011). As a spectacular atypical action, September 11<sup>th</sup> might give the impetus for the formation of a category, as well as delegitimize any organization associated with its perpetrator's type. For example, counterterrorism policy of the last decade has focused on preventing another September 11<sup>th</sup>, even as this event is not typical of most terrorist threats (Cronin 2003; de Jonge Oudraat and Marret 2010; Peers 2003; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). In contrast, a second view is that inertia may also play a role as innovations are rejected for a variety of reasons unconnected to their value or the organizational environment (Strang and Meyer 1993). It is thus quite possible that older markers of terrorist threat and capability will continue to be

used in classification. Assessing these contrasting stories is a subsidiary goal of our study. As we detail later, our data allow us to compare the effects of newer with older markers of classification.

In sum, we theorize that the designation of terrorism occurs in a process not dissimilar to other organizational categorizations, affected by scattered judgments of similarity in the absence of specific formal rules. This is not to suggest that terrorism designations are inherently irrational or unreal. In the absence of complete information, relying on ad hoc judgments may very well be a rational response (see Baier, March and Saetren 1986).

## Data on Designations of Terrorism and Characteristics of Militant Organizations

### *Data*

To examine the factors affecting the listing of terrorist organizations by the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union, data are collected primarily from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 1970-2008 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010). The GTD codes information about terrorist attacks occurring since 1970 along a number of dimensions. We employ a cross-sectional data collection scheme, as the relatively short time period of formal designation of terrorism and the foundation of lists at one time point preclude a robust longitudinal analysis. From the GTD's event data, we identify organizations that can be considered possible candidates for designation by governments. Specifically, we limit our sample to active organizations: the group must have conducted at least one attack since 1994 (as this is the first year covered by formal listing mechanisms) and at least two attacks total since 1970.

Further, we also limit the sample to those organizations that have displayed a degree of capability by yielding at least one victim—killed, wounded, taken hostage or kidnapped. Otherwise, we presume that the organization can be considered inactive or ephemeral, and thus not a candidate for listing. We also remove from the sample individuals, unidentified perpetrators and participatory political parties that do not have an organized militant wing. This results in a sample of 319 militant organizations that have been active from 1994 to 2008 across 76 different countries.

We then match this sample to organizations designated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union from 1997 to 2008 to create a dummy dependent variable of listing status. Not all designated organizations appear in the GTD, some appear under multiple names, and, in some cases, our definition of active organizations excludes designated terrorist organizations. The missing organizations are likely not entirely inactive at the time of designation, but have not engaged in attacks notable enough to be caught by the GTD's coding methods. This suggests that some designated terrorists are not merely highly active organizations (for U.S. designations, 23 groups; for the United Kingdom, 26 groups; and the European Union, 15 groups). We also remove



domestic organizations (for the European Union defined as all European Union member states) and cases with missing data to maintain comparability across the samples. The Appendix lists all active organizations.

Given that governments might designate or not designate an organization as terrorist at different times, we construct three different datasets for the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. We compile data on the organization *up through the first year of formal listing*, covering its activity, characteristics and home country base indicators. When a government employs more than one listing mechanism, we consider the earliest year of designation as the choice of which mechanism to use is primarily one of policy rather than significance of threat (Pillar 2003). For example, Hezbollah was first designated by the U.S. Government in 1997; the data compiled for the U.S. dataset are thus a summary of Hezbollah's activities from 1970 to 1997 according to the GTD. If the group is unlisted, we use data through 2008 as the last year when designations were made.

For each organization, we also identify the primary sovereign country in which it is based at the time of listing, or 2008 if the organization is unlisted, by consulting the Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPs) collected by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (2008), the new Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset (Asal, Rethemeyer and Anderson 2009) and secondary sources. For international or multinational groups, we code the home country based on where the group is headquartered, most active and/or has the majority of its members in a fashion similar to Asal, Rethemeyer and Anderson (2009). While some groups engage in attacks in multiple countries, the vast majority of them are based in the same country in which they primarily operate.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the indicators detailed below for each sample. While the United States has designated the highest proportion of its sample, 20 percent, the United Kingdom and European Union also engage in nontrivial amounts of designation.

### **Attacks and Victims**

To control for the explanation that designations may just represent those groups that have targeted a country's citizens through terrorism as government procedures declare (see European Union 2011; United Kingdom 2000; United State Department of State 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), we employ indicators of attacks and victims. First, we code the cumulative number of attacks attributed to each organization from 1970 through the year of formal designation. We also compile the cumulative number of victims, defined as people killed, wounded, taken hostage or kidnapped up until listing or the year 2008 if unlisted. In addition to cumulative measures, we also employ two measures of recent activity as governments claim to sanction active threats more than historical ones: the number of attacks and number of victims in the last year at time of listing or 2008 if unlisted.<sup>1</sup> Finally, we employ a dummy code for organizations that have attacked the designating country's citizens.

**Table 1. Means (Standards Deviations) of Characteristics of Active Militant Organizations for Three Datasets of Government Terrorism Designations, 1994-2008**

Variable	United States	United Kingdom	European Union
Designated organization (dummy)	.201	.110	.111
<i>Attacks and Victims:</i>			
N of attacks	94.042 (393.299)	92.522 (384.711)	85.376 (373.732)
N of victims	676.719 (3427.626)	758.209 (3587.364)	783.519 (3671.523)
N of attacks last year	5.083 (23.985)	4.708 (22.855)	4.568 (22.831)
N of victims last year	45.032 (219.497)	50.780 (257.056)	58.118 (275.151)
Listing country victims (dummy)	.227	.043	.164
<i>Geopolitical Indicators:</i>			
Allied country victims (dummy)	.377	.425	.035
Based in allied county (dummy)	.252	.080	.362
Imports + Exports of base country (log)	8.407 (2.624)	6.748 (2.471)	8.511 (1.819)
INGO memberships of base country (log)	6.832 (.911)	6.785 (.880)	6.715 (.840)
Regime democracy score of base country	3.879 (6.349)	3.668 (6.394)	3.387 (6.399)
Prior European Union designation (dummy)	.022	.066	-
Prior United Kingdom designation (dummy)	.051	-	.080
Prior United States designation (dummy)	-	.169	.171
<i>Organizational Profile:</i>			
Islamic organization (dummy)	.284	.292	.307
Aviation targets (dummy)	.173	.179	.167
Proportion suicide attacks	.039 (.138)	.041 (.137)	.045 (.143)
N	313	301	287

### ***Geopolitical Concerns***

To address the perspective that terrorist listing might be a product of geopolitical concerns, we primarily code characteristics of the home base country for each militant organization.

First, we include a number of variables that try to capture various dimensions of a designating country's or set of countries' bilateral international relationships. To account for attacks against allied nations, we construct a dummy code of whether or not the organization has attacked the citizens of a country allied with the designating government, determined from the Correlates of War Formal Alliances data (2003).

We also use the alliance data to code whether or not a formal alliance exists between the designating government and the militant group's home country base since 1994. These two dummy variables represent the formal alliance dimension of global politics that may affect designation (see Cronin 2003; Pillar 2003). Next, we code dyadic trade data from the Correlates of War (2003) for the two countries, defined as the sum of imports and exports logged to account for skew. If the organization is not designated we use trade data from 2006, as it is the most recent year available from COW. This indicator is intended to capture resource and economic dimensions of international relations, which can also be read as hegemonic interests (see Johnson 2007; Wallerstein 2004).

Second, to account for possible interactions with global norms and the international community (see Lizardo 2008; Murphy 2003), we employ a common indicator of linkage to world society—international nongovernmental organization memberships in a country in the year of a group's listing, or 2007 if unlisted, drawn from the Union of International Association's Yearbook of International Organizations (2007). As is convention, this indicator is logged to adjust its uneven distribution across countries. Next, to account for geopolitical interests that might vary by regime type (see Mendelsohn 2009), we include the common Polity2 code, which is a regime's autocracy to democracy score (coded as -10 to 10), drawn from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

Finally, as some accounts of terrorism lists emphasize that governments may copy one another's designations (Cronin 2003; de Jonge Oudraat and Marret 2010), we code dummy variables of whether or not the organization has been listed prior to the year of designation (or 2008 if unlisted) by the other two governments considered. Designations occurring in the same year are more likely to be the result of common reaction to common threat or coordinated responses rather than mere copying alone.<sup>2</sup>

### **Organizational Profile**

We use three indicators of the characteristics of a group to analyze our argument that classification of terrorism is based on organizational markers. First, to account for known contemporary threats as posited in  $H_1$  (that Islamic organizations are more likely to be listed), we create a dummy code of whether or not the group is Islamic from the Terrorist Organization Profiles database. For the few cases where the organization is not present in TOPs, this information is gathered from secondary sources. It is important to note that this code employs a definition of Islamic ideological bases and goals that are not restricted to transnational Salafist groups like Al-Qaeda (though the latter bears similar results). Next, to account for images of terrorism from earlier eras, we dummy

code whether or not the organization has attacked an aviation target (planes or airports), a significant effect of which is anticipated by  $H_2$ . Finally, as posited in  $H_3$ , we account for a tactical marker that is threatening and symbolic of innovation—suicide terrorism. From the GTD's coding of the primary tactics used in an attack, we calculate the percentage of suicide attacks.<sup>3</sup>

## Methods and Results of Multivariate Analyses

### *Methods*

We employ multivariate logistic regression where the dependent variable is the dichotomous coding of whether or not an organization has been designated as terrorist by the government in question to estimate the effects of the independent variables on listing status. We also explored multilevel models with country and region as random effects, yet these effects were insignificant and less fitting than one-level logistic regression according to likelihood ratio tests, and are thus rejected. As the American Government's designations may play a central role in guiding the policy of other countries, we first detail the results of multivariate models for the U.S. sample. We then compare this to the results of models of British and European designations. Finally, we explore the evidence for the origins of classification markers and whether or not terrorism designations have shifted as a consequence of September 11<sup>th</sup>.

### *Results for U.S. Designation of Terrorism*

To examine the different perspectives on why a group might be designated as a terrorist, we estimate three models for the American sample (see Table 2). Model 1 in Table 2 examines the group's history of attacks and victims. Interestingly, the cumulative number of attacks and victims do not appear to have a significant effect on the likelihood of being designated a terrorist organization. Similarly, recent activity bears no significant results. However, the dummy code of whether the organization has had American victims is significant with a strong positive effect. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Government is much more likely to list an organization that has hurt American citizens, as the FTO's goals state.

Model 2 adds geopolitical indicators to attack and victim measures. Here the picture is more mixed: organizations that have attacked the citizens of U.S. allied countries are more likely to be designated, but being based in country formally allied with the United States, the regime's democracy score and prior designation by the United Kingdom or European Union have no significant effects. Trade is significantly negatively associated with listing, which is somewhat counterintuitive. It could be read as support for a hegemonic influence interpretation of terrorist designation—the United States is more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to organizations based in countries where there is substantial American economic interest. Or conversely, it could undermine support for this view as it suggests that the American Government is less concerned about political violence and stability in countries in which it has a financial stake.

**Table 2. Results of Multivariate Logistic Regression of Militant Organizations' Terrorist Listing Status by the US Government (N = 313)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N of attacks	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
N of victims	-.0001 (.0001)	-.00004 (.0001)	-.00004 (.0001)
N of attacks last year	-.018 (.013)	-.015 (.013)	-.017 (.014)
N of victims last year	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Listing country victims (dummy)	1.149** (.337)	1.416*** (.371)	1.141** (.388)
Allied country victims (dummy)	-	1.308** (.437)	1.228** (.456)
Based in allied country (dummy)	-	-.772 (.528)	-.786 (.555)
Imports + Exports (log)	-	-.318** (.104)	-.360** (.112)
INGO memberships (log)	-	1.000** (.367)	1.076** (.385)
Regime democracy score	-	-.056 (.035)	-.037 (.037)
EU designated prior (dummy)	-	.265 (.951)	.417 (.983)
UK designated prior (dummy)	-	1.118 (.604)	.991 (.616)
Islamic organization (dummy)	-	-	.908* (.409)
Aviation targets (dummy)	-	-	1.164** (.413)
Proportion suicide attacks	-	-	.136 (1.118)
Constant	-1.843*** (.187)	-6.366** (1.956)	-7.030** (2.045)
Degrees of freedom	5	12	15
Model chi-Square	30.35***	52.78***	64.97***
Log likelihood	-142.005	-130.788	-124.693
Pseudo R-square	.097	.168	.207

\* p &lt; .05; \*\* p &lt; .01; \*\*\* p &lt; .001

The most reasonable interpretation is that this represents failed or failing states that are more likely to harbor terrorists and less likely to engage in substantial international trade. This interpretation is tempered somewhat by the results of global INGO memberships: those countries most connected to world society are more likely to have their resident organizations listed as terrorists. Previous work has found a consistent positive relationship with international embeddedness and modernizing effects on domestic law, policy and practice in a variety of areas (see Meyer 2010). The results here may suggest a similar logic—for those countries with a larger civil society that is more globally connected, political violence is more likely to be regarded as terrorism and an international issue than as a domestic concern alone. Overall, the results do not support a clear-cut story of geopolitical concerns or foreign policy motivations systematically guiding the American designation of terrorism in the same way for every organization. This suggests that if geopolitics has a role, it occurs through ad hoc classification of strategic interests.

Model 3 in Table 2 adds the results of organizational profile indicators. Islamic organizations and groups that have targeted aviation are significantly more likely to be listed, as predicted by  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ . However, the percent of suicide attacks that an organization has conducted has no significant relationship with listing, providing no support for  $H_3$ . The addition of these effects is not marginal—the pseudo R-square improves over Model 2 by almost 4 percent as do other fit statistics. The Islam and aviation effects are also robust—Islamic groups are 2.5 times more likely to be designated than other organizations, and aviation targets increase the likelihood of designation by over three times. Of the 54 organizations that have attacked airplanes or airports, 24 are listed (accounting for 38 percent of designated organizations as compared to 12 percent of unlisted organizations). Over 41 percent of listed organizations are Islamic, even though in our sample Islamic groups are only 28 percent of all groups, account for only 11 percent of all attacks and have created about 38,000 of the over 200,000 victims. While Islamic groups do account for a larger plurality of recent attacks, the consistent lack of significance for our recency measures suggests that the Islam effect is not merely a measured response to threat.

Further, non-Islamic groups were responsible for almost 60 percent of attacks after designations began in 1997 and 53 percent of attacks in 2008 alone. A focus on Islamic groups therefore may be missing a significant percentage of contemporary terrorist activity. But do these pattern hold across government designations?

### ***Results for Other Governments' Designation of Terrorism***

Using multivariate logistic regression where the dependent variable is whether or not an organization is formally designated as terrorist by a government, we estimate the effects of independent variables for the British and European samples. The results are presented in Table 3 and are directly comparable to the models presented in Table 2.

In contrast to the American sample, higher numbers of recent victims are more likely to be designated as terrorists by both governments (see Models 1

**Table 3. Results of Multivariate Logistic Regression of Militant Organizations' Terrorist Listing Status by the UK (N = 301) and EU (N = 287) Governments**

	United Kingdom			European Union		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
N of attacks	.001 (.001)	.0001 (.001)	-.00002 (.001)	.004** (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
N of victims	-.0001 (.0001)	-.00003 (.0001)	-.000001 (.0001)	-.0002* (.0001)	-.0001 (.0001)	-.0001 (.0001)
N of attacks last year	-.038* (.016)	-.027 (.021)	-.028 (.030)	-.041* (.016)	-.011 (.016)	-.016 (.018)
N of victims last year	.005** (.002)	.003 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.005** (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Listing country victims (dummy)	1.135 (.693)	.168 (1.069)	-.050 (1.216)	1.208** (.462)	.460 (.573)	.469 (.579)
Allied country victims (dummy)	-	1.676** (.580)	1.334* (.657)	-	.302 (.596)	.046 (.650)
Based in allied country (dummy)	-	1.183 (.859)	1.854 (.979)	-	2.265* (1.075)	2.600* (1.112)
Imports + Exports (log)	-	-.121 (.258)	-.268 (.284)	-	-.108 (.235)	-.132 (.246)
INGO memberships (log)	-	.458 (.743)	.812 (.832)	-	.467 (.642)	.652 (.683)
Regime democracy score	-	-.186** (.051)	-.158** (.059)	-	-.044 (.052)	-.052 (.055)

*(Continued)*

Table 3. continued

	United Kingdom			European Union		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
EU designated prior (dummy)	-	-.029 (.764)	-.147 (.816)	-	-	-
UK designated prior (dummy)	-	-	-	-	.443 (.676)	.353 (.715)
US designated prior (dummy)	-	2.733*** (.558)	2.635*** (.610)	-	2.534*** (.591)	2.227*** (.612)
Islamic organization (dummy)	-	-	2.255** (.720)	-	-	.181 (.582)
Aviation targets (dummy)	-	-	1.554* (.666)	-	-	1.262* (.609)
Proportion suicide attacks	-	-	1.125 (1.322)	-	-	1.075 (1.373)
Constant	-2.359*** (.219)	-6.205 (3.600)	-9.151* (4.147)	-2.778*** (.277)	-5.809 (3.052)	-7.051 (3.315)
Degrees of freedom	5	12	15	5	12	15
Model Chi-Square	17.70**	83.04***	101.19***	38.25***	73.97***	78.79***
Log likelihood	-95.221	-62.550	-53.478	-81.218	-63.359	-60.948
Pseudo R-square	.085	.339	.486	.191	.369	.393

\* p &lt; .05; \*\* p &lt; .01; \*\*\* p &lt; .001



and 4, Table 3). The European Union is also significantly more likely to designate groups with larger numbers of attacks overall and in the last year, as well as those countries that attack citizens of European Union member states. However, the number of recent attacks has significant negative effects for both European Union and the United Kingdom designations, and the number of victims overall is also negatively associated with listing for the European Union. There is a puzzle here. It is possible that this reflects the effect of founding dates of designations—foreign terrorism designations began for both governments in 2001, and thus may be more attuned to recent threats. Or, perhaps, in the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> environment, fewer but more deadly attacks are taken to be signifiers of threat. Yet given that these effects drop out when other measures are introduced, inferences should be made with caution.

Geopolitical factors are introduced in Models 2 and 5 in Table 3. The British Government is more likely to designate terrorism when allied countries are attacked. This may be an effect of the United Kingdom's numerous Commonwealth relationships and historical alliances. The European Union is more likely to list a terrorist group when it is based in an allied country but not when allied countries are attacked. These results may be because of the construction of alliances as between the entire EU bloc and a home country base, which could alter the alliance effects found in the British and American results. Across both governments' samples, trade and INGO memberships have no significant effect on designation, and higher levels of democracy are negatively associated with listing by the British but not the Europeans. These results may again indicate the role of failed or failing states—terrorist groups may be more likely to be based in autocratic states, in contrast to prior research which has emphasized the targeting of democracies (Pape 2003, 2005; Savun and Phillips 2009). Finally, neither the European Union nor the United Kingdom is influenced by the others' prior designations, but both are significantly more likely to designate a group as terrorist when the United States has previously. This confirms the conclusions of prior research on the influence of American designations (e.g., Cronin 2003).

Finally, the indicators of organizational profiling also yield notable results. For the United Kingdom, suicide terrorism has no effect on designation. Islamic groups and those that have attacked aviation, however, are much more likely to be listed (odds ratios of 9.5 and 4.7, respectively) and with a stronger effect than in the American sample. Like the United States and Britain, the European Union is concerned by groups that target aviation—such a target makes a group 3.5 times more likely to be listed—and unconcerned by suicide terrorism. More interestingly, the Islamic organization dummy has no effect on listing in the European Union sample. This may suggest that the results of the Islamic indicator across models are not just capturing realist national security concerns. The European Union is just as exposed to Islamic terrorism but it is not responding to that threat in the same fashion. Further research is needed to understand this dynamic.

Overall, analysis of the three samples suggests that designation is not merely a reaction to terrorist activity, as measured by attacks and victims, even though each government claims that this is the primary purpose of their listing

mechanisms. Geopolitical indicators do not have consistent relationships with designation in the many of the ways posited by prior research, whether it be governments acting out of economic interests or to protect democracies and allies. Results do confirm, however, that the United Kingdom and the European Union are influenced by American designations of terrorism. Suicide terrorism is not associated at all with designation for any government (contra  $H_3$ ), which suggests that policymakers may not share the fascinations of academics. On the other hand, targeting aviation is taken to be a consistent marker of terrorist threat and capability for all governments (confirming  $H_2$ ). Islamic groups are much more likely to be designated as terrorist by the British and the Americans, but not by the European Union (providing some support for  $H_1$ ). As these positive significant effects are present even when all other factors are controlled for, we take this as evidence that organizational profile of a group does have an impact on categorization. The question remains, however, as to the origin of the organizational markers that influence designation.

## A September 11<sup>th</sup> Reaction?

As outlined previously, there are a number of different ways that seeds for classifying markers can develop. In this section, we consider the evidence as to whether markers represent adaptation to newer images of terrorism or the inertia of older images, as well as the impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> on classification.

The analyses presented above suggest that the seed for classification of terrorism includes both older (aviation) and newer (Islamic) images of terrorism, but that specific innovations (suicide attacks) may take longer to have an effect. Yet it is no secret that counterterrorism was dramatically changed and expanded in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, whether through the introduction of new measures like the Patriot Act, the increase in domestic security in airports and government buildings or the deployment of military assets in a new War on Terror. In fact, some observers have charged that the American Government is focused on preventing another September 11<sup>th</sup> to the extent it might miss other threats (Pillar 2003; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009).

There is a wealth of qualitative evidence that September 11<sup>th</sup> has influenced terrorism designations—in its immediate wake, the United States introduced two new listing mechanisms and the European Union hastened its draft designation process into law (Peers 2003). The content of terrorist lists also seemed to change. The original 1997 FTO list included leftist revolutionaries like FARC, the Japanese Red Army and the Shining Path, as well as nationalist groups that seemed to be from another era like the Real IRA and ETA. In our sample of the two post-September 11<sup>th</sup> American mechanisms (Executive Order 13224 and the Terrorist Exclusion List), less than 20 percent of named organizations are leftist and less than 30 percent are nationalist or separatist. Prior to 2001 only about 30 percent of organizations on the American FTO list are Islamic. Of groups added to the FTO list after 2001, over 70 percent are Islamic.

Table 4 presents changes in the prevalence of organizational profile markers over time for all three governments examined. For the United States, Islamic

Table 4. Organizational Markers of Designated Terrorist Groups by Year for Three Governments

	Year											
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
N of first designations:												
United States	26	0	1	1	22	4	2	1	3	0	0	3
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	20	3	0	0	8	1	1	1
European Union	-	-	-	-	9	17	1	1	2	2	0	0
Proportion Islamic:												
United States	.31	-	1.00	1.00	.36	.25	.50	1.00	1.00	-	-	.67
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	.60	1	-	-	.88	0	1.00	0
European Union	-	-	-	-	1.00	.24	1.00	0	0	0	-	-
Proportion aviation-targeting:												
United States	.61	-	0	0	.23	.50	0	0	0	-	-	.33
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	.60	.67	-	-	.13	0	0	0
European Union	-	-	-	-	.56	.35	1.00	0	1.00	.50	-	-
Proportion suicide attacks:												
United States	.032	-	0	0	.03	.12	.14	0	.62	-	-	0
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	.12	.02	-	-	.02	0	.35	0
European Union	-	-	-	-	.14	.13	.06	0	0	.03	-	-

organizations are all of the designations made in 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005, while British designations of Islamic organizations peak in 2002 and 2007 and European in 2001 and 2003. The proportion of listed groups who attack aviation does seem to decline over time, but as recently as 2006 made up 50 percent of European designations. Suicide terrorism, on the other hand, tends to increase in prevalence, which is not surprising given its more widespread adoption over time (Pape 2005). To examine these trends systematically, we constructed two subsets of the American sample: one for listed and unlisted groups active before September 11<sup>th</sup>, and one for after September 11<sup>th</sup> that removes the groups listed prior to 2001.

Table 5 presents odds ratios from simple logistic regression for the organizational profile indicators. Results show that both before and after September 11<sup>th</sup>, Islamic organizations were about 2.5 times more likely than other organizations to be designated as terrorists. For comparison, we also examined dummy variables of groups with leftist and nationalist-separatist ideological bases (see footnote 4). Both declined from significantly higher likelihoods of listing to insignificant effects, suggesting more exclusive concern about Islamic terrorism after 2001. For those groups that targeted aviation, the odds of being listed declined from over six to an insignificant effect. Conversely, suicide attacks had no significant effect before September 11<sup>th</sup> (the model chi-square is not even significant), but have a significant and positive relationship after. This suggests policy adaptation away from a relatively older form of terrorism, the skyjacking, to a relatively newer form, the human bomber, with consistent attention paid to Islamic militancy to the increasing detriment of other forms.

**Table 5. Odds Ratios from Simple Logistic Regression of Militant Organizations' Terrorist Listing Status by the U.S. Government before and after September 11<sup>th</sup>**

	Before September 11 <sup>th</sup>			After September 11 <sup>th</sup>		
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
Islamic organization (dummy)	2.508*	-	-	2.500*	-	-
Aviation targets (dummy)	-	6.019***	-	-	2.173	-
Proportion suicide attacks	-	-	88.157	-	-	7.533*
Model Chi-Square	4.14*	17.78***	2.66	5.94*	2.73	4.19*
Log likelihood	-81.925	-75.101	-82.661	-103.188	-104.791	-104.061
Pseudo R-square	.024	.106	.016	.028	.013	.020
N	221	221	221	285	285	285

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Overall, this suggests that classification does evolve, but it is unclear whether or not this is due to atypical events or some other process. Further, given the limitations of our subsets, we are not ready to firmly conclude that one argument about the origins of classification is better than another.<sup>4</sup> More research, perhaps using different methods, is needed to resolve this puzzle. For now, we can conclude that the classification seed for terrorism designation is quite complex and seems to evolve in response to stimuli outside of organizational decision making.

## Conclusions

From our analysis of cross-sectional data on listed and unlisted active militant groups, we have found a number of patterns in the classification of terrorism. First, the results cast some doubt on governments' formal declarations that terrorism designation is only a method for sanctioning groups that use terrorism and target a country's citizens. Further research, using alternative measures, should be undertaken to validate this finding. Second, there does not appear to be much of a role for measurable geostrategic concerns, and certainly not in the directions that prior work has posited. This provides little support for views that terrorism designations are driven solely by international concerns or hegemonic interest. Third, we are able to confirm that the United States' terrorist lists have an influence on other countries' designation, even when accounting for other factors.

Fourth, and most notably, we find support for our argument that classifications of militant groups rely on organizational markers of threat. For the American and British Governments at least, organizations that are Islamic and attack aviation are more likely to be listed. We also find some evidence that these characteristics were affected by September 11<sup>th</sup>, but that atypical events are not the only origin of classification. Rather, new tactical markers may replace old tactical markers, and the emphasis on Islamic groups has been consistent throughout the time that terrorism designations have occurred. This last finding underscores our conclusion that typecasting based on ideological affiliation does occur.

There are two primary implications here for research on terrorism. Scholars have been riven over debates on an analytically useful definition of terrorism. We approach our analysis in a definitionally agnostic fashion, which allows for categorization to emerge from evidence rather than a priori assumption. It is possible that further research on "genres" of terrorism and their connection to schemas of classification could help to resolve this debate, or at the very least uncover how various definitions are employed. Second, "audience effects" are a common theme in terrorism studies, but more systematic research on how governments respond to terrorism is needed. The perspective of the categorical imperative employed here suggests a method of analysis for theatrical dimensions of political violence. Perhaps militant groups seeking attention do not receive it unless their actions "fit" with existing categorizations of terrorism, or alternatively, groups that seek to evade the terrorist label might avoid certain

tactics. This might suggest a process by which terrorism becomes more standardized over time building into a repertoire of contentious action.

Our analysis also suggests that the categorization of terrorism may be fruitful for organization scholars to consider. For instance, research tends to focus on the effects of categorization for organizations rather than for categorizers. Government counterterrorism policy could provide an arena for research along the lines of the latter. Also, much of what is known about organizational types comes from studies of fully developed categories, but our research suggests that the rules for typifying terrorism are emergent, involve a mix of older markers and newer markers and have not yet developed into fully mature schemas. Research on the dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism could thus add to our broader knowledge about type formation.

Finally, even though we find that Islamic groups are much more likely to be designated as terrorists, this does not mean that counterterrorism policy is inherently irrational or motivated by bias. Rather, when the threat a group poses is relatively unknown, the use of pairwise comparison to known threats, such as militant Islam, may be a realist adaptation to ambiguity (see Baier, March and Saetren 1986). What is notable here, though, is that organizational profiling is not merely a reaction to a group's historic or recent terrorist actions. If it were, then our results would have found that attacks and victims supersede organizational characteristics, which is not the case at all.

Further, a purely realist interpretation should be tempered by the fact that Islamic groups do not constitute anywhere close to a majority of active terrorist groups nor do they carry out the majority of attacks or harm the majority of victims. However, our findings should not be taken to support a strong social constructionist view of terrorism—Islamic groups do carry out substantial numbers of terrorist attacks and do kill large numbers of people. If a government is most interested in preventing a terrorist attack on the scale of September 11<sup>th</sup>, focusing on organizations that display the capability for high profile and damaging attacks and the ideological motivation to do so may be a good strategy. Yet even so, this would suggest that counterterrorism policy does not merely operate as government procedures detail and may miss emergent threats.

## Notes

1. We also considered several different ways of operationalizing recent activity, examining various permutations of: standardizing by numbers of years active; the peak years of attacks and victims; the average of the peak years; and time since major attacks. Each of these had measurement problems and/or yielded the same results as activity in the last year.
2. We explored a number of other country-level indicators, including gross domestic product per capita, population size, a dummy for OPEC member states and dummy codes for intra-, extra-, and inter-state wars since 1994. None of these had any significant effect in any multivariate model estimated.
3. We also analyzed a number of other organizational features, but these yielded a lack of notable significant results: ideological bases as leftist, nationalist–separatist and other/unknown categories; the tactics of assassination, bombings, armed attacks,

hijacking, hostage taking and kidnapping; and the targets of businesses, governments, police, military, tourists, and other terrorist or political organizations. We also examined indicators from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) dataset on organization size, age, and number of connections to other militant groups. Only the number of connections between groups yielded significant results in the models estimated. Yet BAAD covers a shorter time period than our data, and matching reduces the sample size by about 40 percent.

4. UK and EU foreign designations began in 2001, which does not allow split sample analysis. Limited variation on the dependent variable in the US split samples makes it impossible to get reliable estimates and significant models when all independent variables are included.

## Appendix

**Table A1. All Active Organizations Sampled From the Global Terrorism Database, N = 319**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
1920 Revolution Brigades	-	-	-
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades	-	-	- <sup>a</sup>
Abu Nidal Organization	2001 <sup>c</sup>	2001	2002
Abu Sayyaf Group	1997	2002	2001
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	2001	2001	2001
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)	-	-	-
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)	-	-	-
Al Faran	-	-	-
Al Hadid	-	-	-
Al Jihad	-	-	-
Al-Adl Wal Ihsane	-	-	-
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	2002	-	2002
Al-Arifeen	-	-	-
Al-Badr	-	-	-
al-Fatah	-	-	-
Al-Haramayn Brigades	-	-	-
al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	-	-	-
al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)	2001	2005	2001
al-Jihad	1997	2001	2001
Al-Mansoorian	-	-	-
Al-Nasireen Group	-	-	-
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	-	-	-
Al-Qa'ida in Yemen	-	-	-

(Continued)

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Al-Qa'ida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division	-	-	-
Al-Qaida	1999	2001	2001
Al-Qaida in Iraq	2005	-	-
al-Shabaab	2008	-	-
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin	-	-	-
Al-Umar Mujahideen	-	-	-
Albanian National Army (ANA)	-	-	-
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	2001	-	-
Algeisk Wolves	-	-	-
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	-	-	-
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	2001	-	-
Amal	-	-	-
Andres Castro United Front	-	-	-
Animal Liberation Front	- <sup>c</sup>	-	-
Ansar al-Islam	2003	2005	-
Ansar al-Sunna	2005	2005	-
Armed Forces for Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL)	-	-	-
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	-	-	-
Armed Islamic Group	1997	2001	2001
Army of Islam	-	-	-
Army of the Republic of Ilirida	-	-	-
Aum Shinrikyo	1997	-	2002
Avengers of the Infants	-	-	-
Babbar Khalsa International	2002	2001	2002
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	-	-	-
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	-	-	-
Bangladesh Sarbahara Party	-	-	-
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	-	-	-
Bavarian Liberation Army	-	-	- <sup>a</sup>
Beja Congress	-	-	-
Belarusian Liberation Army	-	-	-
Black Panther Group (Palestinian)	-	-	-
Black Widows	-	-	-
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*



Table A1. *continued*

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)	-	-	-
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)	-	-	-
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	-	-	..a
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)	-	-	-
Catholic Reaction Force	-	..b	..a
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)	-	-	-
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement	-	-	-
Colombia Without Guerrillas	-	-	-
Colombian Patriotic Resistance	-	-	-
Colonel Karuna Faction	-	-	-
Combat 18	-	..b	..a
Commandos for A Popular alternative	-	-	-
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M)	-	-	-
Communist Party of India-Marxist	-	-	-
Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist	-	-	-
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (a.k.a. CPN(M); a.k.a. the United Revolutionary People's Council, a.k.a. the People's Liberation Army of Nepal)	2002	-	-
Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML)	-	-	-
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)	2001	-	2002
Continuity Irish Republican Army	2001	..b	..a
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	-	-	..a
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	-	-	-
Death to Rustlers	-	-	-
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)	-	-	-
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction	1997	-	-
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)	-	-	-
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)	-	-	-
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)/ Dev Sol	1997	2001	2002
Dignity for Colombia	-	-	-
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Direct Action Against Drugs (DADD)	-	- <sup>b</sup>	- <sup>a</sup>
Draa El Mizan Seriat	-	-	-
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	2008 <sup>c</sup>	-	-
Egbesu Youths of the Bayelsa	-	-	-
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Fatherland and Liberty	1997	2001	- <sup>a</sup>
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	-	-	-
Fatah al-Islam	2008 <sup>c</sup>	-	-
Fatah Hawks	-	-	-
Fighting Guerrilla Formation	-	-	- <sup>a</sup>
Filipino Soldiers for the Country	-	-	-
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO); a.k.a. Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Premero de Octubre	2001	-	-
Forest Brothers	-	-	- <sup>a</sup>
Francisco Villa People's Front	-	-	-
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	-	-	-
Free Life Party of Kurdistan	-	-	-
Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	-	-	-
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	-	-	-
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP)	-	-	-
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)	1997	2001	2002
God's Army	-	-	-
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	-	-	2003
Grey Wolves	-	-	-
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	-	-	-
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)	-	-	-
Habr Gedir Group	-	-	-
HAMAS	1997	2001	2002
Harakat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul-Mujahidin	1997	2001	2001
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	2001	2005	-
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Hizb-I-Islami	-	2005	-
Hizballah	1997	2001	-
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	-	-	2005
Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP)	-	-	-
Informal Anarchist Federation	-	-	.. <sup>a</sup>
Iparretarrak (IK)	-	-	.. <sup>a</sup>
Iraqi Islamic Vanguard for National Salvation (IIVNS)	-	-	-
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	-	.. <sup>b</sup>	.. <sup>a</sup>
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	-	.. <sup>b</sup>	.. <sup>a</sup>
Islam Liberation Front	-	-	-
Islambouli Brigades of al-Qa'ida	-	-	-
Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA)	-	-	-
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)	-	-	-
Islamic Courts Union (ICU)	-	-	-
Islamic Front	-	-	-
Islamic Jihad Group	2005	2005	-
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	2000	2002	2001
Islamic Resistance	-	-	-
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)	-	-	-
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	-	-	-
Ittehad-i-Islami	-	-	-
Jadid Al-Qàidah Bangladesh (JAQB)	-	-	-
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)	-	-	-
Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura	-	-	-
Jaish-e-Mohammed	2001	2001	-
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)	-	2007	-
Jamaa Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist Group)	-	-	-
Jamiat ul-Mujahidin (JUM)	2001	-	-
Jamiat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan	-	-	-
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	-	-	-
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	-	-	-
Jaysh al-Muslimin (Army of the Muslims)	-	-	-
Jemaah Islamiya	2002	2002	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Jordanian Islamic Resistance	-	-	-
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad	-	-	-
Jundallah	-	- <sup>b</sup>	-
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	-	-	-
Kach/Kahane Chai	1997	-	-
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	-	-	-
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	-	-	-
Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF)	-	-	-
Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)/Karbi People's Front/United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)	-	-	-
Karen National Union	-	-	-
Karenni National Progressive Party	-	-	-
Khalistan Commando Force	-	-	-
Khalistan Liberation Force	-	-	-
Khalistan Zindabad (Long Live Khalistan)	-	-	2005
Khmer Rouge	1997	-	-
Khun Sa Guerrillas	-	-	-
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	-	-	-
Ku Klux Klan <sup>c</sup>	-	-	-
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)	-	-	-
Kuki National Army (KNA)	-	-	-
Kuki National Front (KNF)	-	-	-
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	-	-	-
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	-	-	-
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	2008	2006	2006
Kurdistan Workers' Party/Kongra-Gel	1997	2001	2002
Landless Peasants' Movement (MST)	-	-	-
Lashkar I Jhangvi	2003	2005	-
Lashkar-e Tayyiba	2001	2001	2002
Lashkar-e-Omar	-	-	-
Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria alirimitare e Preshev's, Medvegj's dhe Bujanocit-UCPMB)	-	-	-
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	1997	2001	2006

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)	-	-	-
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	2001	-	-
Loyalist Volunteer Force	2001	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
M-19 (Movement of April 19)	-	-	-
Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF)	-	-	-
Mahaz-e-Inquilab	-	-	-
Mahdi Army	-	-	-
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents	1997	-	-
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	-	-	-
Miskito Indian Organization	-	-	-
Mohajir National Movement	-	-	-
Mong Thai Army (MTA)	-	-	-
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	-	-	-
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	-	-	-
Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	-	-	-
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)	-	-	-
Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)	-	-	-
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	-	-	-
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)	-	-	-
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)	-	-	-
Mujahedeen Army	-	-	-
Mujahedeen Shura Council	-	-	-
Mujahideen Islam Pattani	-	-	-
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)	-	-	-
Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)	1997	2001	2002
National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)	-	-	-
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	-	-	-
National Democratic Party	-	-	-
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	1997	-	2004
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	-	-	-
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)	-	-	.. <sup>a</sup>
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	-	-	-
National People's Movement Coordination Committee	-	-	-
National Socialist Council of Nagaland	-	-	-
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	-	-	-
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	-	-	-
Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI)	-	-	-
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)	-	-	-
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)	-	-	-
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	-	-	-
Orange Volunteers (OV)	2001	.. <sup>b</sup>	.. <sup>a</sup>
Oromo Liberation Front	-	-	-
Palestinian Islamic Jihad/Al Quds Battalion	1997	2001	2002
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	-	-	-
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)	-	-	-
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	-	-	-
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	-	-	-
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)	-	-	-
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)	2001	-	-
People's Liberation Army (PLA)	-	-	-
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam	-	-	-
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	-	-	-
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (Mexico)	-	-	-
People's Revolutionary Militias (MRP)	-	-	-
People's Revolutionary Organization	-	-	-
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
People's War Group (PWG)	-	-	-
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	1997	-	2002
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)	1997	-	2002
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	-	-	-
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	-	-	-
Popular Resistance Committees	-	-	-
Popular Revolutionary Army	-	-	-
Puka Inti Maoist Communist Party	-	-	-
Purbo Banglar Communist Party	-	-	-
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)	-	-	-
Rajah Sulaiman Movement	2008	-	-
Ranbir Sena	-	-	-
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh	-	-	-
Real IRA	2001	<sup>-b</sup>	<sup>-a</sup>
Red Brigades-Combatant Communist Party (BR-PCC) <sup>a</sup>	2001	-	-
Red Flag (Venezuela)	-	-	-
Red Hand Commandos	-	<sup>-b</sup>	<sup>-a</sup>
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	2001	<sup>-b</sup>	<sup>-a</sup>
Resistencia	-	-	<sup>-a</sup>
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	1997	-	2002
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	-	-	-
Revolutionary Front for Hatian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH)	-	-	-
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)	1997	2001	<sup>-a</sup>
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)/ Revolutionary Nuclei	1997	-	<sup>-a</sup>
Revolutionary Struggle	-	-	<sup>-a</sup>
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	2001	-	-
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)	-	-	-
Rizvon Sadirov Group	-	-	-

*(Continued)*

**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF)	-	-	-
Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)	-	-	-
Salafia Jihadia	-	-	-
Salafist Group for Call and Combat/al-Quada in the Islamic Maghreb	2001	2001	2001
Save Kashmir Movement	-	-	-
Scottish National Liberation Army	-	-	..a
Secret Organization of al-Qa'Äöida in Europe	-	..b	..a
Shahid Khalsa Force	-	-	-
Shan State Army	-	-	-
Shan United Revolutionary Army	-	-	-
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force	-	-	-
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)	1997	-	2002
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)	-	-	-
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	-	2005	-
Sipah-I-Mohammed	-	-	-
Southern Sierra Peasant Organization	-	-	-
Squadrons of Terror (Katibat El Ahoual)/ Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia	2004	-	-
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)	-	-	-
Sudan Alliance Forces	-	-	-
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	-	-	-
Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)	-	-	..a
Taliban	-	-	-
Tamil Liberation Army	-	-	-
Tanzim	-	-	-
Tawhid and Jihad	-	-	-
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)	-	..b	-
Tehrik al-Mojahedin	-	-	-
Terai Army	-	-	-
The Extraditables	-	-	-
The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, Renewed (FLEC)	-	-	-

*(Continued)*



**Table A1. continued**

GTD Name	1st Year US Listed	1st Year UK Listed	1st Year EU Listed
The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan, UIFSA)	-	-	-
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	-	-	-
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	1997	-	-
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	-	-	-
Turkish Hizballah	-	-	-
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)/Ulster Defense Association	2001	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	-	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)	-	-	-
United Action Council	-	-	-
United Front for Democratic Change (FUC)	-	-	-
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	-	-	-
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)	-	-	-
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	-	-	-
United National Party	-	-	-
United Popular Action Movement	-	-	-
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia	2001	-	2002
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors	-	-	-
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)	-	-	-
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	-	-	-
White Legion (Georgia)	-	-	-
White Wolves (UK)	-	<sup>b</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
World Church of the Creator	<sup>c</sup>	-	-
Young Communist League	-	-	-
Young Patriots	-	-	-
Zapatista National Liberation Army	-	-	-

**Note:** Because of missing data or domestic status, cases are excluded from analysis in:

- a) European Union sample
- b) United Kingdom sample
- c) United States sample

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