PHIL 185L: Topics in Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind

Conceivability and Possibility

 

 

Term: Spring 2005

Meeting: Wednesday 7–9:50 p.m., Pearsons 203

Instructor: Peter Kung

Contact: Peter.Kung@pomona.edu

Office Hours: Tuesday/Thursday 4–5, Monday 2–3 in Pearsons 209 (or by appointment)

My intention is to run this course like a graduate seminar.  Each week we will examine two to three papers in detail (typically we'll discuss one paper for about half the session, take a break, and then turn to the others).

Regular participation in discussion is encouraged and expected. For two out of every four sessions, prepare a brief note (one to two pages) on the week's reading. The notes should be emailed to me by Monday evening.

Your note will be a précis of some material from the reading. A précis might focus on a single article or a section of a single article; it might take up instead an issue or argument discussed in one or more of the articles. Either way, your note should present the gist of the article, section, issue, or argument. These notes should also include your thoughts on the matter: an issue or distinction you think needs clarification, or some original comment, question, or objection.[1]

A paper of roughly ten pages is due at the end of the semester. To help you write your paper, a report (roughly four pages) will be due in the 11th or 12th week of the semester. Your report will contain your original thoughts on a topic, which may take the form of a critique or discussion of some article, or of some argument or position developed in one or more of the articles. Each student will present his/her report to the class for discussion, and on the basis of the discussion the report can be revised and expanded into the term paper.

 

Reading List

 

Week 1

Introduction

Possible worlds

Overview of philosophy of mind

What Descartes’s conceivability argument is not

 
 

Week 2

Descartes

Excerpts from Descartes’s Meditations, Objections & Replies, Principles of Philosophy

Van Cleve, J. (1983). Conceivability and the Cartesian argument for dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 34–45.

  
 

Week 3

Hume

Excerpts from Hume’s Enquiry, Treatise

Lightner, T. (1997). Hume on Conceivability and Inconceivability. Hume Studies, 23(1), 113–32.

Peter Thielke (ms.) “Conceiving Contravening Cases”

  
 

Week 4

more Descartes

Yablo, S. (1990). The real distinction between mind and body. Canadian Journal of Philosophy supplementary volume 16, 149–201.

Schiffer, S. (1976). Descartes on his essence, Philosophical Review 85: 21-43.

  
 

Week 5

Kripke

Kripke (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Chapter 3

  
 

Week 6

Yablo

Yablo, S. (1993). Is conceivability a good guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(1), 1–42.  
 

Week 7

Skepticism

Tidman, P. (1994). Conceivability as a test for possibility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31(4), 297–309.

Van Inwagen, P. (1998). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 92, 67–84.

  
 

Week 8

Imagination

Kind, A. (2001). Putting the image back in imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 85–109.

Kung (ms.) “Imaginability as a guide to possibility”

Sacks, Oliver. (July 28, 2003). The mind's eye. New Yorker, vol. 79, no. 20, 48-59.

 
 

« spring break »

  
 

Week 9

More on
imagination

Kung (ms.) “Imaginability as a guide to possibility II ”

Hill, C. (1997). Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies, 87, 61–85.

  
 

Week 10

First-person perspective

Nagel, T. (2002). The psychophysical nexus. In Concealment and exposure and other essays. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shoemaker, Sydney. (1993). The first-person perspective. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 68(2), 7–22. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, & Güzeldere, (Eds.), (1997), 503–15.

  
 

« April 6 no class »

« Meet with me during this week to discuss your paper topic (preferably after Wednesday). »

  
 

Weeks 12

Berkeley's Puzzle

Williams, B. (1966). Imagination and the self. British Academy Annual Philosophical Lecture. Reprinted in Williams (1973).

Peacocke, C. (1985). Imagination, experience, and possibility: A Berkeleian view defended. In J. Foster & H. Robinson (Eds.), Essays on Berkeley. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

  
 

Weeks 13

A Priori Explanation

 

Excepts from Balog, K. (1999). Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review, 108(4), 497–528.

Block, N., & Stalnaker, R. (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review, 108(1), 1–46.

Chalmers, D., & Jackson, F. (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. Philosophical Review, 110(3), 315–60.

  
 

Week 14

Presentations

 Steve, Maggie, Per, Shayle, Elisa, Betsy, Max  
 

Week 15

Presentations

 Wiley, Erik, Carrie, Nicole, Fred, Kacie, Jessica, Libby  
       


[1] I may increase the number of notes required if only a few students regularly contribute to discussions.